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 Over the past 20-30 years international relations as an academic field has felt as if 
in a crisis of relevance to the real world.  By contrast, the nominal subfield of IR—
strategic studies—has not felt itself to be in crisis, despite endless predictions about the 
obsolescence of war.  This paper explores the sources of the disparity in relevance 
experienced by the two fields and what lessons may be drawn from this disparity for the 
future of strategic studies.  Fundamental to the inquiry is the issue of relevance itself, 
particularly key questions of relevance to whom and relevance how?  The way IR and 
strategic studies as disciplines construct their own theories both reflects and influences 
implicit answers to these questions. This paper examines each of the fields, its theories, 
and theory construction, with particular reference to the “whom and how” questions of 
relevance.  The ultimate conclusion is that, unlike strategic studies, IR has put itself into a 
trap; strategic studies should avoid suffering a similar self-inflicted crisis. 
 Theory in the strategic studies field is premised on the most fundamental 
assumption: it is meant to be relevant to strategic action.  This has been strategic studies’ 
constant anchor even before it was an actual academic field.  In principle this does not 
differ substantially from IR, notwithstanding the disparity in scope between strategic 
agency in war and all of international relations as such.  Nonetheless, the forms of theory 
diverge substantially. Two strands of theory exist in strategic studies: classical (including 
neo-classical) and modern. The former encompasses the writings of theorists and 
practitioners from Sun Tzu to Jomini, Clausewitz, Ferdinand Foch, Basil Liddell Hart, 
together with neo-classical theorists such as Edward Luttwak, Colin Gray, and Hew 
Strachan.  Modern strategic theory emerged with the nuclear age and dwindled after the 
arguable early-Cold War golden age. 
Although these theoretical strands are similar, there are key differences.  Classical 
strategic theory was written by practitioners for practitioners, from Sun Tzu to Foch and 
Liddell Hart. Hence strategic theory was associated with and written for a particular 
professional class: military practitioners, primarily of command rank. From the beginning 
strategic theory had a particular purpose: not merely explaining what to do but also how 
to do it.  There was a sustained recognition that strategy was performed and did not 
happen automatically.  Classical theory approached this question of performance by its 
most prominent advocates: Jominian theory and Clausewitzian theory. The former is 
prescriptive, whereas the latter is educative.  From the outset modern strategic theory was 
different, in some ways attempting to abandon the anchoring concept of performance of 
war.  However, it could never totally eschew performance, even relating narrowly to 
nuclear strategy, and neo-classical theorists of the next generation of academic strategists 
returned performance to the center of strategic theory in a distinctly Clausewitzian way. 
By contrast, IR has no single body of theory and the field is riven by 
methodological, paradigmatic, and purposive differences, which result not merely in a 
variety of theories, but also in those theories taking on varying forms, purposes, and 
methods for study.  This is unsurprising given the sheer breadth and variety of 
phenomena which IR encompasses as a field.  Nonetheless, mainstream IR theory tends 
to focus on higher levels of abstraction—such as Kenneth Waltz’s theory of neo-
realism—which considers international relations as a general system without much 
substantive reference to the actual real world.  Alongside this level of abstraction came 
ambitions to be scientific and to enable prediction of outcomes in international relations.  
Yet the desired level of prediction is incompatible with contingency in action, which in 
turn is at the heart of performance.  Mainstream IR theory in particular entirely neglects 
performance. 
The consequence of neglecting performance is that IR theory has no specific 
professional class to which it should be relevant, and simultaneously there is little 
incentive for any particular professions to be interested in IR theory because theory has 
nothing to say about any group’s core professional interests in performing well.  This 
leaves IR theory with only a small group of people to which it could be usefully relevant: 
policymakers.  Indeed, it has been notable in IR’s soul-searching over the course of its 
crisis that virtually only policymakers have ever even been mentioned.  Simultaneously, 
because IR theory is not about performing well, it became about deciding well, about 
making the right policy choices, which in turn reinforced the emphasis on policymakers 
as the key demographic to which theory must be relevant. 
To compare the relevance of strategic studies and IR to their respective fields, the 
whom and how questions are crucial.  In both cases, strategic studies enjoys more 
inclusive and more concrete answers than IR, resulting in a much firmer basis for 
practical relevance.  Strategic theory has a core professional, practitioner audience to 
which is must relate and it maintains that relevance by performance amid contingency.  
By contrast, IR answers both questions much more narrowly by focusing on 
policymakers and policy choices, and therefore feels that it is increasingly irrelevant to 
the actual practice of international relations.  IR has theorized itself into a relevance trap, 
which strategic studies should avoid if it wishes to remain relevant. 
